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 28 
ABSTRACT 29 
Metacognition, the ability to monitor one’s own decisions and representations, their accuracy and 30 
uncertainty is considered a hallmark of intelligent behaviour. Little is known about metacognition 31 
in real-world situations where the brain is bombarded with signals in different sensory modali-32 
ties. To form a coherent percept of our multisensory environment, the brain should integrate signals 33 
from a common cause, but segregate those from independent causes. Perception thus relies on infer-34 
ring the world’s causal structure, raising new challenges for metacognition. We discuss the extent 35 
two which observers can monitor their uncertainties not only about their final integrated percept but 36 
also about the individual sensory signals and the world’s causal structure. The latter causal meta-37 
cognition highlights fundamental links between perception and other cognitive domains such as so-38 
cial and abstract reasoning. 39 
 40 
 41 
TRENDS 42 
To form a coherent percept of our multisensory environment the brain needs to integrate signals 43 
caused by a common source (e.g. event), but segregate those from different sources; natural multi-44 
sensory perception thus relies inherently on inferring the world’s causal structure.  45 
Human observers are known to metacognitively monitor the uncertainty of their perceptual esti-46 
mates in simple sensory tasks, but it is unclear whether they can monitor their uncertainties about 47 
their integrated percept, the individual sensory signals and the causal structure of complex multi-48 
sensory environments. 49 
Causal metacognition highlights fundamental links between perception and other cognitive domains 50 
such as social and abstract reasoning and may be critical for our understanding of neuropsychiatric 51 
diseases such as schizophrenia. 52 
 53 
 54 
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MAIN TEXT 58 
Metacognition: Monitoring one’s own cognition 59 
‘Metacognition’ refers to cognitive processes about other cognitive processes, knowing about 60 
knowing, or beliefs about one’s own beliefs.  It describes the formation of second-order representa-61 
tions that allow observers to monitor their first-order representations about objects or events in the 62 
real world [1–3]. Metacognitive research investigates the extent to which observers can assess the 63 
uncertainty or accuracy of their perceptual representations and judgments. For instance, observers 64 
cannot only spot a friend in the crowd, but also metacognitively evaluate their uncertainty or doubt-65 
fulness about their first-order perceptual interpretation (e.g., “Is this really my friend?”). In a wider 66 
sense, though, metacognition characterizes an observer’s ability to introspect the perceptual infer-67 
ence processes that led to their first-order world representations [4]. Metacognition can operate in a 68 
number of domains including perception [5–7], memory [8,9], collective decision-making [10] and 69 
social learning [11,12].  70 
Despite a recent surge of interest in metacognition, the majority of perception research to date has 71 
focused on simple visual or auditory tasks that were based on one single signal stream [7,13–16]. 72 
Yet, in our natural environment, our senses are constantly bombarded with many different signals. 73 
In order to form a coherent percept of the world, the brain is challenged to integrate signals caused 74 
by common events, but segregate those caused by independent events. Natural perception thus re-75 
lies inherently on inferring the world’s causal structure. In this review, we focus on the challenges a 76 
natural complex environment poses not only for first-order perception, but also for second-order 77 
metacognition. First, we introduce Bayesian Causal Inference as a normative model that describes 78 
how an ideal observer should arbitrate between sensory integration and segregation when exposed 79 
to multiple sensory signals in our natural environment [17–19]. Next, we discuss whether observers 80 
can monitor their uncertainties associated with the different sorts of estimates that Bayesian Causal 81 
Inference involves, such as the uncertainties about their final integrated percept, the individual sen-82 
sory estimates, and the inferred causal structure of the world [2,20,21]. Finally, we ask 83 
er human observers can move beyond the integrated percept and metacognitively introspect those 84 
perceptual inference processes. Is multisensory perception encapsulated as an unconscious infer-85 
ence process, or is it open to metacognitive introspection? While we focus on multisensory percep-86 
tion and cue combination as prime examples for the integration of information from independent 87 
sensory channels [17,22,23], the fundamental challenges and principles apply more generally to sit-88 
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uations and tasks that require information integration and segregation in perception and wider cog-89 
nition (Box 1). 90 
Metacognition enables human and non-human observers [24] to act more strategically, for instance, 91 
to determine whether or not to defer a response and acquire more information [20,25]. Causal meta-92 
cognition is, in particular, critical for situations with information emanating from potentially differ-93 
ent sources not only in perception, but also in social and abstract reasoning [17,26].  94 
 95 
Metacognition in perception 96 
In the 19th Century, Helmholtz described perception as ‘unconscious inference’ that maps from 97 
noisy sensory inputs to perceptual interpretations and choices under the guidance of prior experi-98 
ence [27]. Likewise, more recent Bayesian statistical models formalize perception as a probabilistic 99 
inference process whereby the brain combines prior expectations with uncertain sensory evidence to 100 
infer the most likely state of the world [28]. Perception is thus inherently uncertain and error-prone. 101 
Metacognitive research investigates whether observers can assess their uncertainty about the per-102 
ceptual representations that are formed on the basis of noisy sensory evidence. Are observers ap-103 
propriately confident about the accuracy of their perceptual choices and eventually use this infor-104 
mation to adjust subsequent responses [21,29]? Accumulating evidence based on decisional confi-105 
dence ratings [30], no loss gambling [31], or post-decision wagering [32,33] demonstrates that hu-106 
man and non-human observers can indeed access the uncertainty of their perceptual representa-107 
tions and adjust their decisional confidence accordingly. In some cases, observers even compute 108 
their confidence about the correctness of their perceptual judgment (e.g., motion discrimination) in 109 
a Bayes-optimal fashion. In other words, their confidence truthfully reflects the probability that 110 
their perceptual choices are correct given the sensory signals (e.g., motion) [29]].  111 
Critically, observers’ decisional confidence depends on the uncertainty of their first-order perceptu-112 
al representations (for other influences, see [34]). For instance, when presented with weak motion 113 
signals, observers will not only be close to chance when discriminating motion direction but also 114 
when judging whether their motion discrimination response was correct. In other words, observers’ 115 
perceptual sensitivity (e.g., their ability to discriminate left from right motion, say) constrains their 116 
maximally possible metacognitive sensitivity (i.e., their ability to discriminate between their correct 117 
and incorrect choices) [14,35]. While d’ is used as a signal-theoretic index to quantify observers’ 118 
perceptual sensitivity, meta-d’ has recently been proposed as a signal-theoretic index to quantify 119 
observer’s metacognitive sensitivity. A large meta-d’ indicates that observers can reliably discrimi-120 
nate between their correct and incorrect perceptual judgments. Critically, while meta-d’ depends on 121 
both the quality of the sensory evidence and its metacognitive assessment, directly comparing the 122 
perceptual and the metacognitive d’ quantifies observer’s metacognitive efficiency [14,35]. It pro-123 
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vides insights into an observer’s ability to evaluate the uncertainty of their perceptual representa-124 
tions and choices. A ‘metacognitively-ideal observer’ (i.e., where  meta-d’ is equal to d’) can access 125 
all information that was used for the first-order perceptual judgment for his/her second-order meta-126 
cognitive evaluation. 127 
Abundant evidence suggests that the brain is able to represent and use estimates of uncertainty for 128 
neural computations in perception, learning, and cognition more widely [21–23,36,37]. Yet, the un-129 
derlying neural coding principles remain debated. For instance, uncertainty may be represented in 130 
probabilistic population codes  [38,39] or else rely on sampling-based methods [40]. Likewise, it 131 
remains controversial whether metacognitive ‘confidence estimates’ are directly read-out from first-132 
order neural representations [13,20] or formed in distinct ‘metacognitive’ neural circuitries 133 
[7,41,42]. In support of a shared system, or common mechanism, underlying perceptual decisions 134 
and confidence, neurophysiological research has demonstrated that the same neurons in a lateral 135 
parietal area encode both monkey’s perceptual choice and its confidence [43,44]. Dissociations be-136 
tween perceptual choice and confidence may emerge when decision confidence is interrogated after 137 
the subject committed to a perceptual choice thereby relying on different sensory evidence 138 
[3,13,45]. By contrast, neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies in humans point toward dedi-139 
cated metacognitive neural circuitries in the prefrontal cortex [7,42,46]. For instance, fMRI work 140 
revealed that activations in anterior prefrontal cortex reflect changes in confidence when perceptual 141 
performance is held constant [47]. Likewise, patients with anterior prefrontal lesions showed a se-142 
lective deficit in metacognitive accuracy [42]. Decisional confidence estimates encoded in dedicat-143 
ed circuitries may serve as a common currency and enable direct comparisons across different cog-144 
nitive tasks [15] or sensory modalities [5]. 145 
 146 
The multisensory challenge: Causal inference and reliability-weighted integration 147 
Imagine you are packing your shopping items from your trolley into the back of your car which is 148 
parked on a busy street. Suddenly you hear a loud horn. Is this sound coming from a car on the op-149 
posite side of the road, competing for a parking spot, or from a car hidden behind your back indicat-150 
ing that your trolley is blocking the traffic? Or is the sound perhaps coming from one of your shop-151 
ping items? While the latter suggestion seems rather unlikely, the other two may be valid interpreta-152 
tions of the sensory inputs (see figure 1). This example illustrates the two fundamental computa-153 
tional challenges that the brain faces in our everyday multisensory world: First, it needs to solve the 154 
so-called causal inference problem [17–19] and determine whether or not signals come from com-155 
mon sources and should be integrated. Second, if two signals come from a common source, the 156 
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brain is challenged to integrate them into the most reliable percept by weighting them optimally in 157 
proportion to their reliabilities (i.e., inverse of sensory variance [22,23,48,49]). 158 
In the laboratory, the principles of multisensory integration can be studied by presenting conflicting 159 
and non-conflicting signals. For instance, if auditory and visual signals are presented in synchrony 160 
yet at different spatial locations, the ventriloquist illusion emerges. The perceived sound location 161 
shifts towards the location of a spatially distant visual signal and vice versa depending on the rela-162 
tive auditory and visual reliabilities. Importantly, spatial biasing is reduced at large spatial dispari-163 
ties when it is unlikely that the two signals come from a common source [50,51]. This attenuation 164 
of sensory integration at large spatial disparities is well accommodated by hierarchical ‘Bayesian 165 
Causal Inference’ that explicitly models the potential causal structures that could have generated the 166 
sensory signals i.e., whether auditory and visual signals come from common or independent sources 167 
[18,52] (for related models based on heavy tailed prior distributions, please see [17,53,54]). During 168 
perceptual inference, the observer is then thought to invert this generative process. Under the as-169 
sumption of a common signal source, the two unisensory estimates of a physical property are com-170 
bined and weighted according to their relative reliabilities (i.e., inverse of variance). For instance, to 171 
estimate the location of a singing bird from audition and vision the observer should give a stronger 172 
weight to the visual signal at day time than at night. Under the hypothesis of two different sources, 173 
the auditory and visual signals are treated independently. On a particular instance, the brain needs to 174 
infer the causal structure of the world (e.g., one or two sources) from the sensory inputs. Multiple 175 
sorts of intersensory correspondences [55] such as spatiotemporal coincidence (i.e. auditory and 176 
visual signals happening at the same time and location [56–62], semantic (e.g. the shape and 177 
singing of a bird) [63–65] or higher-order correspondences (e.g., gender: female voice with female 178 
face) can inform the brain as to whether signals are likely to come from a common source or 179 
independent sources. Finally, an estimate of the physical property in question (e.g., auditory loca-180 
tion) is obtained by combining the estimates under the two causal structures using different deci-181 
sional functions [18,52,66]. For instance, using model averaging observers may form a final esti-182 
mate by averaging the estimates from the two causal structures weighted by their posterior probabil-183 
ities. Alternatively, they may report the estimate of the most likely causal structure as final estimate, 184 
a decisional strategy referred to as model selection. 185 
 186 
Monitoring uncertainties about the world’s causal structure and environmental properties 187 
The additional complexity of multisensory perception or more generally tasks that rely on multiple 188 
information channels raise questions and challenges that go beyond metacognition studied, for ex-189 
ample, with simple visual discrimination or detections tasks. In particular, it raises the question of 190 
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whether observers can monitor the different sorts of uncertainties involved in Bayesian Causal In-191 
ference: 192 
First, observers may monitor their uncertainty about the causal structure that has generated the 193 
sensory signals [18,19,66]. The uncertainty about the causal structure increases with the noise in the 194 
sensory channels. For instance, at dawn, it is more difficult (i.e. associated with greater uncertainty) 195 
to attribute a singing voice to a specific bird in the bush than in bright sunlight. Hence, the 196 
uncertainty about the inferred causal structure critically depends on the sensory uncertainty given in 197 
all sensory channels [52]. Moreover, causal uncertainty emerges because there is some natural 198 
variability in the temporal, spatial or higher-order (e.g. semantic) relationship of the sensory signals. 199 
Even when two signals are generated by a common source, they do not need to be precisely 200 
temporally synchronous or spatially collocated. For speech signals, it is well established that visual 201 
facial movements often precede the auditory signal to variable degrees at speech onset [67]. 202 
Further, differences in velocity of light and sound induce variability in arrival times of the visual 203 
and auditory signals at the receptor level that depend on the distance of the physical source from the 204 
observer [68,69]. Likewise, higher-order correspondences, such as gender or semantics may relate 205 
probabilistically to low level physical features (e.g. a low-pitched voice is more likely to be 206 
associated with a male than a female person). Experimentally, we therefore need to determine 207 
whether observers’ causal uncertainty reflects the uncertainty determined by the signal-to-noise 208 
ratio of the sensory signals and their spatiotemporal and higher-order (e.g. semantic) statistical 209 
relationships. Moreover, causal uncertainty may be influenced by participants’ prior expectations 210 
[70,71] that sensory signals are likely to come from a common external source, or be generated by 211 
one’s own voluntary actions [72,73] (see Box 3). 212 
Second, it is well-established that observers use the uncertainty associated with the individual cues 213 
or sensory signals to assign the appropriate weighting during cue combination or multisensory 214 
integration. Yet, an unresolved question is whether these uncertainty estimates for individual cues 215 
are then lost or accessible for metacognition. To approach these questions, future experiments may 216 
consider asking observers to explore objects visuo-haptically (i.e., via vision and touch) and report 217 
both the haptic size they perceived and their uncertainty about their perceptual estimate in the 218 
context of the visual information as well as if they had fully ignored the visual information (e.g., 219 
they  may be asked to imagine that they had closed their eyes and only haptically explored the 220 
object). If observers maintain partial access to the unisensory estimates and their associated 221 
uncertainties we would expect that the two reports differ.  222 
Finally, observers may monitor their uncertainty associated with their final perceptual estimate (e.g. 223 
the reported location during audiovisual localization tasks). According to Bayesian Causal 224 
Inference, these final (e.g., auditory and visual) perceptual estimates are formed by combining the 225 
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estimates under the assumptions of common and independent sources according to various decision 226 
functions such as model averaging, probability matching or model selection [66]. As a result, the 227 
uncertainty of these final Bayesian Causal Inference perceptual estimates is dependent on 228 
observer’s sensory and causal uncertainty. A critical question for future investigation is to 229 
determine the extent to which observers’ uncertainty about their reported perceptual estimate 230 
reflects their perceived causal uncertainty or the causal uncertainty as predicted based on their 231 
sensory uncertainties. 232 
A few studies have started to directly tackle the question of metacognitive uncertainty or confidence 233 
estimates in multisensory perception, albeit not always with these different sorts of uncertainties in 234 
mind. For instance, a recent psychophysical study [74] demonstrated that observers’ correctly 235 
assessed the accuracy of their temporal order judgments in confidence ratings. These results 236 
indicate that the precision of audiovisual temporal relation estimates is accessible to metacognition. 237 
Further, a recent study by White and colleagues [75] presented observers with audiovisually non-238 
conflicting (e.g., visual <<ba>> with auditory /ba/), conflicting phonemic cues that could be 239 
integrated into a so-called McGurk percept (e.g., McGurk: visual<<ga>> with auditory /ba/ 240 
resulting in an illusory [da] percept) and conflicting phonemic cues that could not be integrated into 241 
one unified percept (i.e., non McGurk: visual <<pa>> with auditory /ka/). Observers reported their 242 
perceived auditory phoneme, immediately before providing a second-order confidence rating. The 243 
authors demonstrated that observers were less confident about their illusory McGurk percepts than 244 
about their auditory percept for conflicting or non-conflicting stimuli. From a Bayesian Causal 245 
Inference perspective, observers’ lower confidence about their McGurk responses may emerge from 246 
an increase in causal uncertainty for McGurk stimuli. While non-conflicting signals are likely to 247 
come from a common source and conflicting signals from independent sources, McGurk stimuli 248 
introduce an intermediate phonological conflict that introduces uncertainty about the underlying 249 
causal structure. This causal uncertainty may indirectly influence and increase observers’ 250 
uncertainty about their final phoneme percept. However, this is only one of several possible 251 
explanations for the observed response profile (see also [76]). It highlights the need for future dual-252 
task paradigms that ask observers concurrently to rate not only their confidence about their 253 
phonological percept, but also their causal uncertainty about whether sensory signals (e.g. auditory 254 
phoneme and facial movements in speech recognition) were generated by a common source. 255 
 256 
Perceptual and causal metamers 257 
Further insights into whether observers can move beyond the integrated percept and metacognitive-258 
ly monitor the perceptual inference can be obtained from so-called metamers, i.e. (near)-identical 259 
perceptual interpretations formed from different combinations of sensory signals [77]. Let’s assume 260 
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we present an observer with two signals in synchrony, a brief flash at -2º visual angle (i.e. left) and 261 
a spatially equally reliable beep at +2º visual angle (i.e. right). Where will the observer perceive this 262 
event? Because of the small audiovisual spatial disparity, the observer may infer that the two sig-263 
nals come from a common source and hence integrate them weighted by their relative reliabilities. 264 
As a result, he would perceive the audiovisual event at 0º degree visual angle, where in fact no sig-265 
nal was presented at all. Hence, this conflicting flash-beep event would elicit the same percept as 266 
a non-conflicting flash-beep event where both auditory and visual signals are presented at 0º degree 267 
visual angle. In other words, the conflicting and the non-conflicting flash-beep events elicit percep-268 
tual metamers. Moreover, the observer inferred that the auditory and visual signals come from a 269 
single event in both situations. Hence, the two cases elicit not only perceptual but also causal met-270 
amers. The critical question is whether observers may nevertheless be able to discriminate between 271 
the conflicting and non-conflicting flash-beep events indicating that they can metacognitively ac-272 
cess additional information about the underlying perceptual inference process. 273 
First, observers would be able to discriminate between the non-conflicting and conflicting signals, if 274 
they monitor their uncertainty about their perceptual interpretation and causal inference. In the 275 
small conflict case, those observers who use Bayesian Causal Inference with model selection may 276 
decide that the two signals come from a common source and integrate them weighted by their rela-277 
tive reliabilities. Critically, even though they commit to one single event as the more likely causal 278 
structure, they should be less certain about their causal inference. In other words, monitoring their 279 
causal uncertainty would allow observers to discriminate between conflicting and non-conflicting 280 
sensory signals, even if they elicit perceptual and causal metamers. Within the framework of Bayes-281 
ian Causal Inference and depending on decisional functions and biases [66], it is also conceivable 282 
that observers may integrate different combinations of auditory and visual signals into the same 283 
perceptual (e.g. auditory, visual) estimates and yet report different causal structures. Hence, percep-284 
tual metamers may not necessarily imply causal metamers. 285 
Second, observers may be able to go beyond the integrated percept and maintain at least partial ac-286 
cess to the individual sensory signals (see discussion above). Again, this partial access would allow 287 
them to discriminate between conflicting and non-conflicting flash-beep events. In a wider sense of 288 
metacognition it would demonstrate that multisensory perception is not informationally encapsulat-289 
ed, but that observers can introspect and metacognitively monitor the unisensory representations 290 
that form the basis for their perceptual inference. 291 
Surprisingly, only a few studies to date have used perceptual metamers as an approach to character-292 
ize observers’ metacognitive access in cue combination. An intriguing early study by Hillis et al. 293 
[77] focused on the emergence of perceptual metamers in visual (slant from disparity and texture 294 
cues in vision) and visuo-haptic (object size from vision and touch, i.e., haptic cues) contexts. In an 295 
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oddity judgment task, observers were asked to identify the odd stimulus in a sequence of three 296 
stimuli: two identical standard stimuli defined by non-conflicting cues and one odd stimulus defined 297 
by conflicting cues that could be fused into a perceptual metamer of the standard stimulus [77,78]. 298 
The results revealed that observers lost access to individual cues in the visual, but not in the visuo-299 
haptic setting: Only conflicting visual cues were mandatorily fused into perceptual metamers of the 300 
non-conflicting standard stimulus. Yet, even in the visual case participants were able to discriminate 301 
the conflicting stimulus from the non-conflicting ones for larger conflict sizes indicating that meta-302 
mers emerge only for small conflict size. What happened, though, in those unisensory cases with 303 
larger conflict? As the oddity judgment task does not explicitly define the dimension according to 304 
which participants should compare the stimuli, it remains unclear whether observers identified the 305 
conflicting stimulus because they did not integrate the conflicting cues into one unified slant esti-306 
mate, i.e., into a perceptual metamer of the non-conflicting stimulus, or whether instead they inte-307 
grated them, but were aware that their metameric percepts emerged from different causal structures 308 
or at least associated with different causal uncertainties. Observers may still have fused conflicting 309 
signals into approximate perceptual metamers without them being causally metameric to the non-310 
conflicting standard stimulus. In other words, observers may potentially have identified the odd-311 
one-out because of partial access to the causal structure that has generated the sensory inputs. In-312 
deed, observers reported a ‘weird’ percept for larger conflict sizes (personal communication, Marc 313 
Ernst) indicating that they were aware of the conflict manipulation while still integrating signals 314 
into a near-unified percept.  This may perhaps be taken as initial evidence that perceptual and causal 315 
metamers may be to some extent dissociable. Future studies that explicitly assess the emergence of 316 
perceptual and causal metamers are needed to experimentally determine whether participants can 317 
form perceptual metamers while recognizing that they are based on different causal structures.  318 
Another approach to dissociate perceptual and causal metamers is to introduce conflicts along mul-319 
tiple dimensions such as lower temporal and higher-order phonological dimensions. For instance, 320 
observers may be presented with conflicting and non-conflicting visual and auditory phonetic cues 321 
at multiple audiovisual asynchronies. For small audiovisual asynchronies, conflicting audiovisual 322 
signals, such as a visual <<ga>> and an auditory /ba/,  may be fused into a [da] percept at the pho-323 
nological level as in the classical McGurk-MacDonald illusion [79] (Figure 2). The critical question 324 
is whether the fusion of conflicting audiovisual signals into a [da] percept as a perceptual metamer 325 
of a non-conflicting audiovisual [da] emerges in cases where observers inferred that the two signals 326 
come from different sources because of their audiovisual asynchrony (i.e., no causal metamer).  327 
Research showing that the temporal integration windows that allow the McGurk illusion to emerge 328 
mostly correspond to those where observers perceive the audiovisual signals as being synchronous 329 
has suggested that the detection of temporal conflicts precludes the emergence of perceptual meta-330 
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mers [80]. However, other evidence suggests that conflicting visual phonetic information influences 331 
the perceived auditory phonemes even when observers are able to detect low-level temporal con-332 
flicts [81]. In the light of this controversial evidence, future studies are needed to determine whether 333 
perceptual metamers at higher representational levels emerge even when lower level temporal con-334 
flicts prevent the emergence of causal metamers. 335 
 336 
Concluding remarks 337 
Accumulating evidence shows that human observers can metacognitively assess the uncertainty of 338 
perceptual estimates formed from vision, touch or audition, in unisensory perception. Conversely, 339 
research in multisensory perception demonstrates that observers integrate signals from multiple 340 
sensory modalities into percepts that take into account the uncertainty about the world’s causal 341 
structure. In this review, we have merged these two research fields and discuss the new challenges 342 
and questions that metacognition poses for situations where the brain needs to integrate information 343 
from multiple channels such as in multisensory perception and cue combination. Recent 344 
developments of hierarchical Bayesian models of multisensory perception raise the possibility that 345 
human observers can introspect perceptual inference processes and monitor not only the final 346 
integrated percept, but also the unisensory estimates and the causal relationship - thereby 347 
challenging the long-dominant view in philosophy that observers are causally naive about 348 
perceptual inference (Box 2). Future studies in causal metacognition will need to determine the 349 
extent to which human observers can accurately assess their uncertainty about the perceptual 350 
estimates and the inferred causal structure of the environment. They open up new research avenues 351 
that link metacognition in perception more tightly with higher-order cognitive capacities such as 352 
abstract causal reasoning [82] or the aggregation of information across agents (Box 1 and 353 
Outstanding Questions). Causal metacognition sheds new light on the emergence of the sense of 354 
agency [83] (Box 3) and will be critical for our understanding of neuropsychiatric diseases such as 355 
schizophrenia that affect multisensory binding, causal inference and metacognitive control [75,84–356 
87]  357 
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 Box 1: Monitoring causal uncertainty beyond perception.  358 
Causal inference is not only critical for perception but, more generally, for many other cognitive 359 
domains such as inductive, abstract, or social reasoning [82]. If two burglaries occur in the same 360 
town on the same day, the police ought to inquire as to whether they are likely to be performed by 361 
the same or different criminal gangs. Likewise, if a patient presents initially with a rash followed by 362 
high fever, cough, shortness of breath and wheezing, the medical doctor needs to infer whether all 363 
these symptoms are caused by measles infection or whether some of them may be caused by a 364 
subsequent bacterial (e.g., streptococcal) superinfection which requires antibiotic treatment. These 365 
examples highlight that causal inference is pervasive in our everyday lives. Causal metacognition 366 
enables observers to monitor their uncertainty about the underlying causal structure and decide 367 
whether to seek additional evidence in order to arbitrate between several potential causal structures. 368 
If the medical doctor is in doubt whether the patient may have incurred an additional streptococcal 369 
infection, s/he may order blood tests, chest x-ray, etc. 370 
Causal inference is also fundamental for successful communication and interactions across social 371 
agents. For instance, if two social agents talk about a person called ‘Peter’ they usually assume that 372 
they refer to the same person as the causal source that generates their thoughts and representations 373 
associated with ‘Peter’. In fact, this shared causal perspective is fundamental for successful 374 
collective decision making [10]. Surprises and comic moments may emerge if agents discover 375 
during the course of their conversation that their inference was wrong and they had actually been 376 
referring to two different individuals that were both called ‘Peter’. In other words, they suddenly 377 
discovered that their thoughts and representations were not caused by one common source ‘Peter’, 378 
but by two different individuals.  379 
Causal Inference as a process to arbitrate between one or multiple causes for sensory signals, 380 
medical symptoms or mental representations is part of the wider question of how observers can 381 
infer hidden structure from statistical correlations in observed data (e.g. correlations between 382 
different symptoms). How can they build veridical or at least useful models of the world? As 383 
reviewed in more detail in [17,88–90], Bayesian models can be used to accommodate human 384 
structure inference across numerous domains including inductive reasoning [82], semantics [91], 385 
social cognition [10] or aggregation of information across individuals [92].   386 
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Box 2: Challenging causal naivety assumptions in philosophy 387 
The capacity to represent causation is usually granted only on the evidence that explicit causal rea-388 
soning, and inferences to hidden or distant causes are performed. As Hume’s challenge goes, there 389 
is a difference in predicting that one event regularly follows another, and in representing that it was 390 
caused by this first event. This view, started in philosophical discussions [93], is also widespread in 391 
psychology [94]. Does causal metacognition challenge this claim, suggesting that we are sensitive 392 
to differences between hidden causal structures when we perceive events? How sophisticated do we 393 
need to be to monitor the uncertainty of our causal models of the world? 394 
Evidence of causal metacognition in younger children and non-human animals should address this 395 
question, and possibly reveal whether hidden causal structures are accessed and monitored as such, 396 
even in the absence of more explicit causal reasoning. But causal metacognition brings a broader 397 
challenge to philosophical models of perception. It is widely assumed indeed that we are causally 398 
naive when it comes to perceiving the world: Perception does not make us aware of objects as caus-399 
es of our perception [95]. When we perceive a singing bird, we do not see that a physical bird, or 400 
light, is causing our perception: We perceive a bird, as a mind-independent object, not as a likely 401 
cause of our percept. The claim that perception rests on a process of causal inference, at the sub-402 
personal level [96,97], though widely accepted by cognitive neuroscientists, explains from the out-403 
side what the system is set up to do, but does not suppose that causes are represented as such, even 404 
less consciously accessed [98,99]. Sensitivity to differences in the causal origin of our integrated 405 
percepts offers an intermediate step where the causal character of perception is made manifest.     406 
How this form of causal metacognition fits within causal cognition in general, and whether it is also 407 
present in more explicit forms of reasoning is an open question. While it is common to stress the 408 
difference between aggregating information between agents, and combining information from dif-409 
ferent sensory modalities, it might be the case that both are optimal if the uncertainty about the un-410 
derlying causal model dictating the problem is adequately monitored.  411 
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Box 3: Causal metacognition and sense of agency 412 
Causal inference enables the brain to dissociate the sensory effects caused by one’s own actions 413 
from those caused by other agents or events in the outside world. Previous neuroimaging and 414 
neurophysiological studies have suggested that the cerebellum may form a predictive forward 415 
model that maps from the action plan to the motor outputs and their sensory consequences. These 416 
forward models enable the brain to distinguish between self- and other-generated sensory signals 417 
leading to effects such as sensory attenuation (e.g.. predicted outputs of our own tickling are not felt 418 
as tickling [100]) or intentional binding (e.g. the temporal interval between a voluntary action and 419 
its sensory consequences is subjectively compressed [72,73,83], see figure I). Both effects are 420 
considered central to our sense of agency that is the subjective judgment or feeling that we are 421 
causally responsible for changes in the environment. Critically, the temporal compression effect 422 
was increased in patients with schizophrenia indicating an enhanced sense of agency [85–87]. From 423 
the perspective of causal metacognition, we would expect the sense of agency to be related to the 424 
degree of confidence about our beliefs that a certain sensory outcome was self- rather than other-425 
generated [84]. Further, manipulating biases in confidence by prior context or instructions may 426 
influence sensory attenuation and intentional binding, even when the sensory and motor 427 
components are held constant. For instance, if an agent is more confident that he/she has generated 428 
certain sensory signals, he/she should experience the same signal as less tickling and the interval 429 
between the action and the occurrence of the tickling sensation to be less compressed in time. A 430 
critical question for future research is therefore whether the altered sense of agency in patients with 431 
schizophrenia [85], may be associated with more general changes in causal metacognition.  432 
 433 
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GLOSSARY 435 
Causal metamers: identical causal structures inferred from signals generated by physically different 436 
causal structures. 437 
Causal metacognition: monitoring the inferred causal structure underlying certain signals (e.g. 438 
sensory signals)  439 
Confidence rating, post-decision wagering, no loss gambling [30]: are methods to assess an 440 
observer’s metacognitive insights or awareness. For instance, observers may rate their confidence 441 
about the correctness of their decision on a numerical scale. In post-decision wagering, they are 442 
asked to bet on the correctness of their reported choices. As a result, observers should place higher 443 
wagers when they are more confident about the correctness of their decision to maximize their 444 
gains. In no-loss gambling, observers need to choose whether they are given a reward depending on 445 
the correctness of their perceptual choice, or depending on a lottery with pre-specified probabilities. 446 
Both post-decision wagering and no-loss gambling provide observers with an incentive to reveal 447 
their decisional confidence and subjective probabilities truthfully. Yet, post-decision wagering may 448 
be sensitive to additional biases such as risk aversiveness.  449 
Bayesian Causal Inference models: normative Bayesian models that describe how an observer 450 
should integrate sensory signals to compute an estimate of an environmental property.  Bayesian 451 
Causal Inference [17–19,52,66] explicitly models the potential causal structures (i.e. common or 452 
independent sources) that could have generated the two signals.  453 
Intersensory correspondences: the observer uses different sorts of correspondences such as spatial 454 
colocation [50–52,58,59], temporal coincidence [56,57,60] and correlations [61,62], semantic or 455 
phonological congruency [63–65] to determine which signals are likely to come from a common 456 
source and should be bound during perception. 457 
Perceptual metamers: are identical perceptual (e.g. spatial, phoneme) estimates formed from 458 
physically different signals.  459 
Metacognition: cognitive processes about other cognitive processes (e.g. formation of 460 
representations about world representations [1–3,24]).  461 
McGurk illusion: an audiovisual illusion [71,79,81] where observers perceive for instance the 462 
phoneme [da] when presented with a video of a face articulating <<ga>> and a voice uttering /ba/. 463 
16 
The McGurk illusion is a prime example of a perceptual metamer; i.e. the conflicting signals are 464 
perceived as identical to a face and voice articulating [da]. 465 
Sense of agency: the subjective feeling that one initiates and controls one’s own actions [72,73,83]. 466 
Sensory reliability: is the inverse of sensory variance (or uncertainty). Reliability decreases with the 467 
noise of a sensory signal. 468 
Ventriloquist illusion: a multisensory perceptual illusion induced by presenting two signals from 469 
different sensory modalities in synchrony, but at different spatial locations. In classical audio-visual 470 
cases, the perceived location of a sound is shifted towards the actual location of the visual signal, 471 
and vice versa [18,50–52]. 472 
 473 
 474 
 475 
 476 
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OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS 478 
‣To what extent can observers metacognitively monitor the individual signals, the inferred causal 479 
structure, and their respective uncertainties in sensory or cue-integration? Do their perceptual 480 
uncertainties reflect their causal uncertainties, and vice versa? 481 
‣How does causal metacognition in perception relate to metacognition in other cognitive domains 482 
such as causal reasoning or social interactions? 483 
‣What are the benefits of causal metacognition in perception? Do observers adjust their future 484 
perceptual interpretations based on their causal metacognitive assessments?   485 
‣Is the sense of agency grounded in causal metacognition?  486 
‣Which neural circuitries sustain causal metacognition during perceptual and other cognitive tasks 487 
in the human brain? 488 
‣Is causal metacognition impaired in neuropsychiatric diseases such as schizophrenia? 489 
‣How does causal metacognition develop during infancy and childhood? Does it emerge later than 490 
metacognition about perceptual decisions based on a single information stream? 491 
‣Non-human organisms have been shown to monitor their uncertainties about their perceptual 492 
decisions. Can they also monitor their uncertainty about the causal structure of the world? 493 
 494 
 495 
 496 
 497 
 498 
 499 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 502 
Figure 1 503 
Metacognition in multisensory perception  504 
Left: Generative Model: The generative model of Bayesian Causal Inference for spatial localization 505 
determines whether the ‘visual car’ and the ‘sound of the horn’ are generated by common (C=1) or 506 
independent (C=2) sources (for details, see [18]). For common source, the ‘true’ audiovisual 507 
location (SAV) is drawn from one prior spatial distribution. For independent sources, the ‘true’ 508 
auditory (SA) and ‘true’ visual (SV) locations are drawn independently from this prior spatial 509 
distribution. We introduce independent sensory noise to generate auditory (xA) and visual (xV) 510 
inputs [18]. 511 
Middle: Bayesian Inference Model: During perceptual inference the observer is thought to compute 512 
three sorts of estimates from the auditory and visual signals for spatial localization: 1. spatial 513 
estimates under the assumption of common source (i.e., forced fusion estimate: 𝑆𝐴𝑉,𝐶=1� ) and 514 
independent sources (i.e. full segregation estimates separately for auditory and visual locations: 515 
𝑆𝑉,𝑐=2� , 𝑆𝐴,𝐶=2� ), 2. estimates of the causal structure and 3. the final auditory and visual Bayesian 516 
Causal Inference spatial estimates based on model averaging that take into account the observer’s 517 
causal uncertainty by marginalizing (i.e. integrating) over the different causal structures: 𝑆𝑉�, 𝑆𝐴�). 518 
Each of those estimates is associated with uncertainties as indicated by the specified probability 519 
distributions. 520 
Right: Metacognition may be able to access and monitor the three sorts of estimates and their 521 
uncertainty: 1. forced fusion and full segregation spatial estimates, 2. the inferred causal structure 522 
and 3. the final auditory and visual Bayesian Causal Inference spatial estimates. 523 
 524 
Figure 2 525 
Perceptual and causal metamers in the audiovisual McGurk illusion 526 
Left: Observers are presented with non-conflicting audiovisual stimuli, i.e. a video of a face 527 
articulating <<da>> and a voice uttering /da/. They will perceive the audiovisual signals as coming 528 
from one source and integrate them into a [da] percept. 529 
Right: Observers are presented with conflicting audiovisual stimuli, i.e., a video of a face 530 
articulating <<ga>> and a voice uttering /ba/. In the McGurk illusion, they should perceive the 531 
19 
audiovisual signals as coming from one source and integrate them into a [da] percept, which would 532 
be a causal and perceptual metamer to the estimates formed from the non-conflicting audiovisual 533 
signals. However, perceptual and causal inference may also result in other outcomes. Observers 534 
may potentially perceive a [da] and yet recognize the audiovisual conflict and hence infer that the 535 
two signals come from independent sources (i.e. perceptual metamer but no causal metamer). 536 
 537 
 538 
Figure I (Box 3)  539 
Intentional binding, sense of agency and causal metacognition 540 
Observers have been shown to perceive the interval between an action and its sensory consequences 541 
(e.g., a ‘beep’) of a certain duration that is temporally compressed, when the action was voluntary 542 
and associated with a sense of agency – a phenomenon referred to as ‘intentional binding’ [72]. 543 
Causal metacognition may be closely related to the sense of agency by virtue of monitoring the 544 
uncertainty about the causal relationship between one’s own voluntary actions and their sensory 545 
consequences.  546 
 547 
 548 
 549 
 550 
 551 
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